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ABSTRACT
Many of those close to the Congressional legislative process seem
to view the short titles of bills as “branding” rather than official legal
instruments. In fact, this may be one of the reasons that some short titles
for bills and laws have become tendentious and overly aspirational.
This is problematic for such titles, as they are formally recognized by
their inscription into federal law, and thus transcend their “branding”
purposes, thereby putting the legal status of short titles in an awkward
juxtaposition. By stripping away all of the current legal barriers that
would technically negate such a prospect, this Article considers whether
contemporary short bills titles would pass the U.S. Federal Trade
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Commission’s (“FTC”) deceptive practice scrutiny. Relying on three
main pieces of evidence (the FTC Policy Statement on Deception, the
FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, and the
landmark Kraft, Inc. v. FTC decision), this Article demonstrates that
many congressional short titles do employ deceptive advertising
practices and would be actionable under FTC standards.
I.

INTRODUCTION

As people progress throughout their day, they are knowingly and
unknowingly engulfed in a myriad of rules, regulations, and laws from a
number of law-making institutions at many levels. It just so happens
that mailing a letter, swiping a credit card, depositing a monthly pay
check, dropping the children off at school, logging into an email
account, or just picking up groceries for the week, among a multitude of
other daily activities, are actions that are directly or indirectly legislated
by federal, state and local governments. Many of these legislated
functions are government services (i.e. postal, educational, etc.), while
others are regulations of one sort or another (food and drug labeling,
financial regulation, etc.).
Most federal laws and regulations have one distinct origin: the
United States Congress. It is here that legislators propose bills that they
try to sell not only to one another, but also to organizations, interest
groups, journalists, and perhaps most importantly, the American public,
so that such measures will pass. And federal bills are unregulated in
terms of what lawmakers choose to name their bills while legislators are
1
in the midst of ‘selling’ these proposals. No matter what members of
Congress end up naming legislation, one thing is certain: the impact that
federal law has on the American public is immense. Not enforcing any
type of official guidelines or recommendations for accurately carrying
out one of the most basic legislative functions—inscribing short bill
titles—seems inadequate and potentially damaging to U.S. consumers
(including citizens that encounter and interact with these laws). Though
it likely would never happen, we thought it would be interesting to
consider whether many current short bill titles would pass U.S. Federal
1

See generally, OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. COUNSEL, U.S. H.R., 104TH CONG., HOUSE
COUNSEL’S
MANUAL
ON
DRAFTING
STYLE,
§321(a)
(1995),
http://www.house.gov/legcoun/pdf/draftstyle.pdf. (The Manual provides little in the way of
recommendations for short titles. What it does suggest, however, is to keep such titles short.
However, these recommendations are not compulsory, and are rarely followed).
LEGISLATIVE
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Trade Commission (“FTC” or the “Commission”) scrutiny in terms of
deceptive advertising practices. Since Congress provides no standards
for such titles in terms of deception, we thought we would look to
another source, the FTC. This Article will first provide some
background about bill titles in the U.S. Congress and explain the
problem of tendentious, misleading and deceptive titles more
thoroughly by using a few specific bills as case studies. The Article then
investigates how FTC standards might apply when assessing such
legislative titles by examining the FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
the Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, and the
landmark Kraft, Inc. v. FTC decision. Ultimately, it finds that the
myriad of tendentious and promotional congressional short titles would
be problematic under many of these commercial standards.
II.

PROBLEMATIC CONGRESSIONAL TITLES

Legislating in the United States Congress can be an entertaining
affair. This statement is particularly true in relation to some of the short
bill titles inscribed on official congressional statutes. Throughout the
years these titles have become increasingly evocative (USA PATRIOT
2
3
Act of 2001 and Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 ),
4
5
humorous (CAN SPAM Act and Credit CARD Act ), and all6
encompassing (Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, No Child
7
Left Behind Act of 2001 ). Essentially, they have become an endless
game for legislators, as the more evocative or memorable the short title,
8
9
the better. Some acts can provide us with a sense of CALM, remind us
2
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
3
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632.
4
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM)
Act of 2003 Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (2003).
5
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). Located inside the acronym of that Act are the words
“accountability” and “responsibility,” two words that contrast mightily with the notion of
credit, and especially credit cards, making the moniker quite humorous.
6
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
7
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001).
8
Walter J. Oleszek, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS, 93 (8th Ed.
2011); See generally, R. Douglas Arnold, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990);
(forthcoming) Brian Christopher Jones, Processes, Standards & Politics: Drafting Short
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that America COMPETES or PROTECT[s] Our Children and
12
provides research for PREEMIE[s], or announces that it is okay to
13
drink SAFETEA.
It appears, based on interviews discussed below, as if no matter
how outlandish or evocative a short title may be, if the bill is approved
by both chambers and signed by the President, the short title is inscribed
as federal law. Therefore, the political branding devices that
Congressional members use when bills are traveling through the
legislative process are making their way into U.S. law. This provides a
strange juxtaposition for such titles, as they are employed to serve two
very different purposes: first, as branding devices in the legislative
process; and second, as elements of statutory law. It may come as no
surprise that many individuals close to the legislative process view them
as branding devices rather than law.
This perspective was confirmed when co-author Jones performed
interviews with a number of Congressional staffers and other political
14
insiders on the status of short bill titles. Common reactions included:
15
16
that they were merely “branding;” served a “branding purpose;” were
17
useful “from a branding perspective;” were used for “press reasons or
18
19
marketing reasons;” were “marketing strateg[ies];” and that some
members would “put a little more effort into coming up with a clever

Titles in the Westminster Parliament, Scottish Parliament and US Congress 25(1) FLA. J.
INT’L L. (2013).
9
Commercial Advertisement Loudness Mitigation (CALM) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-311,
124 Stat. 3294 (2010).
10
America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology,
Education, and Science (COMPETES) Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572 (2007).
11
Providing Resources, Officers, and Technology to Eradicate Cyber Threats to
(PROTECT) Our Children Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-401, 122 Stat. 4229 (2008).
12
Prematurity Research Expansion and Education for Mothers who Deliver Infants
Early (PREEMIE) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-450, 120 Stat. 3341 (2006).
13
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity (SAFETEA) Act: A
Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005). One can see from the actual
short title, but not the acronym, that the Act has nothing to do with the tea beverage.
14
Confidential Interviews conducted with U.S. Congressional staffers and members of
the American media in Washington, D.C. (2009).
15
Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 6, U.S. Cong., in D.C. (Oct. 21, 2009).
16
Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 3, U.S. Cong., in D.C. (Oct. 26, 2009).
17
Id.
18
Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 5, U.S. Cong., in D.C. (Oct. 22, 2009).
19
Confidential Interview with Member of the Media, in the U.S. (Oct. 22, 2009).

JONES-SHAHEEN FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

FTC SCRUTINY OF SHORT BILL TITLES

1/18/2013 1:17 PM

95
20

short title, or . . . brand-worthy short title” if they deem it necessary.
Others noted that “there’s so much more that you can do with a name
21
now,” while another staffer said that short titles came down to
22
“member style.” Thus, those close to the legislative process seemed to
view such devices merely as branding instruments, similar to how
products are marketed in the business world, employing witty catchphrases and slogans in order to tempt customers to purchase them. As
with any branding tactic, short titles also then become powerful tools to
sell proposed legislation. For example, who would not want to vote for
a law that “leaves no child behind,” “saves homes,” or “protects
23
consumers?” In turn, who would not want to make gains against rivals
and defeat opposing party members who vote against, for example,
24
“saving homes?”
For the purpose of the current Article, we will accept that short
titles are a form of legislative branding, and may not necessarily be held
to the accuracy standards of most legal and statutory language.
Therefore, in a sense short titles are the advertising for a particular law,
just as the branding of a product is used in the advertising for that
product. Below, we explore what is and what is not lawful in regard to
advertising, and specifically, deceptive advertising, in order to provide a
rare but essential insight into the ethics of bill naming. However, to
demonstrate the scale of the problem, this piece first delves into some
notorious bills, their accompanying short titles, and their overall
effectiveness.
Unfortunately, there are many examples of problematic legislation
(to be discussed) not fulfilling the lofty aspirations declared in the short
title. These titles usually make heroic assumptions about what the
proposals will accomplish, thus misleading and deceiving those who
encounter the legislation. Legislators may vote for a proposal based in
part on its title, particularly given the length of many proposed bills, or
because they fear the political consequences of opposing a bill whose
20

Id.
Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 5, supra note 18.
22
Confidential Interview with Cong. Staffer 4, U.S. Cong., in D.C. (Oct. 26, 2009).
23
See e.g. No Child Left Behind Act, supra note 7; Helping Families Save Their Homes
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1362; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
24
Arguably, gains against rivals could potentially be achieved even if the reason
opponents voted against the positively-sounding legislation was due to a belief that the
proposed legislation would not in fact achieve its ‘branded’ ends.
21
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25

short title carries voter appeal. Similarly, members of the public likely
have even less opportunity or inclination to digest the legislation in
depth, and yet may make election decisions based in part on how their
representatives vote. Below are a few examples of prominent
Congressional acts that certainly did not do what they said on the
surface, and may be problematic from the FTC’s viewpoint.
A. No Child Left Behind Act 2001
With one of the most infamous bill names in recent American
26
history, the No Child Left Behind Act was enacted in January 2002.
The misleading nature of the name is facially apparent: education is a
human endeavor, and thus will never be flawless in operation.
Therefore, to suggest that no child will be left behind because of a
federal education policy is an outlandish and absurdly misleading
statement. Nevertheless, it remains law, even though President Obama
and U.S. Education Secretary Arne Duncan have spoken on numerous
27
occasions about overhauling it.
Some may see the title as a symbolic slogan not meant to be taken
literally, while others expressly use the title as an accepted educational
doctrine. For example, a 2005 Department of Education report to
Congress stresses that the law “raises expectations for States, local
28
educational agencies, and schools,” and the report boldly declares that
“[e]very child can learn. Every child must learn. And thanks to NCLB,
29
every child will learn”. Thus, the inflammatory and misleading
25

Brian Christopher Jones, Drafting Proper Short Titles: Do States Have the Answer?,
23(2) STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 455-76 (2012). (noting that politicians and staffers admit that
short titles can affect whether or not a bill becomes a law). See also Brian Christopher
Jones, Processes, Standards and Politics: Drafting Short Titles in the Westminster
Parliament, Scottish Parliament and US Congress, 25(1) FLA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming
2013) (A Congressman admits that he “get[s] hurt politically” every time he votes against a
bill with an evocative short title.).
26
No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006).
27
Weekly Address: President Obama to Send Updated Elementary and Secondary
Education Act Blueprint to Congress on Monday, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 13, 2010, 6:00
AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-sendupdated-elementary-and-secondary-education-act-; See also Arne Duncan, Escaping the
constraints of “No Child Left Behind,” WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/escaping-the-constraints-of-no-child-leftbehind/2012/01/06/gIQAYmqpfP_story.html.
28
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT ANN. REP. 1 (2005), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/nclb/nclbrpt2005.pdf (emphasis in original).
29
Id. (emphasis added).
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language throughout the report complements the title of the legislation
as the statements located in the document traverse the barrier from
being symbolic political rhetoric into genuine expectation.
Not only has the lofty standard set by the title and by the enhanced
governmental expectations failed, but the results have been
catastrophically inadequate. For example, a 2011 report to Congress by
Education Secretary Duncan, which includes the 2008-09 data, notes
that in more than 50 percent of states, the percentage of fourth-grade
student proficiency compared to eighth-grade proficiency was higher
for both mathematics and reading/language arts—for mathematics this
was true for 89 percent of states, while for reading/language arts it was
30
true for 53 percent of states. And these results were observed
approximately seven years after the Act was passed.
An examination of state-level statistics regarding these two
markers for high school students produced some ominous performances
in terms of proficiency: District of Columbia (43 percent - Math); New
Hampshire (32 percent - Math); Maine (42 percent - Math); Hawaii (34
percent - Math); Washington (41 percent - Math); Rhode Island (27
percent - Math); Kentucky (41 percent - Reading); California (54
percent - Reading); Michigan (50 percent - Reading); Minnesota (41
31
percent - Reading); New Mexico (35 percent - Reading). However,
there are many examples of states doing quite well: Alabama (85
percent - Math); Maryland (85 percent - Math); Nebraska (90 - Math);
Virginia (91 percent - Math); New York (89 percent - Reading); South
32
Carolina (87 percent - Reading); and Ohio (81 percent - Reading). The
District of Columbia reports that at the end of the 2009-2010 schoolyear, only fifteen out of 195 public schools hit their “Adequate Yearly
33
Progress” (AYP) goals, or 8 percent of schools. Also, many states
remain under 50 percent in terms of science proficiency for elementary
34
school, middle school and high school students. Overall, these results
sharply contrast with expectations. While some states are doing well in
proficiency for mathematics or reading/language, many still drastically

30
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT ANN. REP. FOR SCH. YEAR 2008-09
1, 10 (2011), available at www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/eseareport2008-2009.doc.
31
Id. at 12.
32
Id.
33
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT ANN. REP. FOR SCH. YEAR 2009-10
48 (2012), available at www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/esea-report-2009-2010.doc.
34
Id. at 25.
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under-perform, and thus do not live up to either the symbolic or literal
essence of the law.
This is clear evidence that over a decade after NCLB was passed,
children are still being left behind at very high rates. But this analysis is
not an outright condemnation of the Act itself, as surely an education
policy that mandates many changes, and must be funded to achieve
success, could still do so if implemented correctly. Indeed, many
35
schools are improving each year. This is, however, a condemnation of
the title of the Act. Contrary to the 2005 U.S. Department of Education
36
report, the basic premise of “every child will learn” is outlandish to
suggest, as such an outcome is plainly not feasible in any regard. At this
point, the Act’s title would certainly fail a prima facie test on any level–
and perhaps disastrously so.
B. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003
The Prison Rape Elimination Act was signed by President George
37
W. Bush on September 4, 2003, and also set quite a high standard
through its short title. Though it uses the word “elimination,” neither the
word nor any reference to eliminating prison rape, was used in President
38
Bush’s signing statement about the legislation. A 2006 statement on
the Act by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the branch primarily
responsible for researching the topic, did not mention “elimination”
either; instead, the NIJ noted that the Act may “sharply reduce”

35
ANN. REP. FOR SCHOOL YEAR 2008-09, supra note 30, at44-45, available at
www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/eseareport2008-2009.doc.
36
ANN.
REP.
1
supra
note
30,
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/nclb/nclbrpt2005.pdf.
37
Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (2003).
38
George W. Bush, Statement on Prison Rape Elimination Act, WHITE HOUSE:
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030904-9.html. Although he did use the
signing statement to verify that the Executive Branch would not be handing much
information over to the Prison Rape Commission, he noted in his second paragraph that
“Section 7(h) of the Act purports to grant to the Commission a right of access to any Federal
department or agency information it considers necessary to carry out its duties, and section
7(k)(3) provides for release of information to the public. The executive branch shall
construe sections 7(h) and 7(k)(3) in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional
authority to withhold information when its disclosure could impair deliberative processes of
the Executive or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties and, to the extent
possible, in a manner consistent with Federal statutes protecting sensitive information from
disclosure.”
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institutional sexual violence by making the issue a “high priority.”
Even the long title of the bill, which is supposed to accurately describe
40
the proposal, did not mention eliminating or even sharply reducing
prison rape, as it states:
An Act to provide for the analysis of the incidence and effects of
prison rape in Federal, State, and local institutions and to provide
information, resources, recommendations, and funding to protect
41
individuals from prison rape.

It could be that the word was used because the primary purpose of the
Act was to “establish a zero-tolerance standard for the incidence of
42
prison rape. . . in the United States,” a similar standard to the NCLB
measure discussed above.
The implications of the Act’s title are quite apparent: it seeks to
eliminate rape in all American correctional facilities. Though not
mentioned in the title, jails and other local and state correctional
43
institutions are included. At the time of passage, Congress
44
conservatively estimated that nearly 13 percent (or over 200,000) of
current inmates had been sexually assaulted at least once, and close to
45
one million inmates had been assaulted in the past twenty years. It also
noted that juveniles housed in adult facilities are five times more likely
to get sexually assaulted than when housed in juvenile facilities, and
there is increased risk for sexual assault in the first forty-eight hours of a
46
juvenile’s incarceration.
Though the bill had worthy aspirations, to date it has hardly
eliminated or even “sharply reduced” sexual victimization in
American’s prisons and jails. For example, by 2006 reports of incidents
by correctional authorities were up from 2.46 in 2004 to 2.91 inmates
47
per 1,000 inmates. The total number of allegations by correctional

39

NIJ’s Response to the Prison Rape Elimination Act, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Feb.
2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213137.pdf.
40
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE, supra note 1, §32, 1(a).
41
42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2006).
42
42 U.S.C. § 15602(1) (2006).
43
Id. § 15601 (3).
44
By their own admission, Id. § 15601(2).
45
Id. § 15601 (2).
46
Id. § 15601(4).
47
ALLEN J. BECK, PAIGE M. HARRISON & DEVON B. ADAMS, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 218914, SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY
CORRECTIONAL
AUTHORITIES
3
(2006),
available
at
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authorities in adult correctional facilities has steadily risen each year,
48
from 6,241in 2005, to 6,528 in 2006 to 7,374 in 2007, and 7,444 in
49
2008. A 2010 report on sexual victimization in prisons estimates that
88,500 current inmates in prisons and jails across the country had been
sexually victimized; 4.4 percent of prison inmates and 3.1 percent of jail
50
inmates had been victimized in the past twelve months. The prison
51
number seems to be holding steady, as the figure was 4.5% in 2007.
However, the most shocking numbers come from youth facilities, where
an estimated 12 percent of youth in 2008-09 were victimized by either
52
another youth or a facility staff member.
53
Many of the provisions of the Prison Rape Elimination Act
present genuinely purposeful efforts on the part of the government to
reduce the phenomenon: § 15603 directs the Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS) to carry out annual reports on prison rape; § 15604 implements a
National Institute of Corrections clearinghouse to provide information
and training to correctional authorities on prison rape; § 15605
authorizes appropriations to correctional facilities for the protection of
inmates; § 15606 establishes the (more appropriately named) National
Prison Rape Reduction Commission; § 15607 directs the Attorney
General to issue national standards on prison rape reduction within one
year after receiving the report from the Commission; and § 15608
prohibits facilities that have not adopted the national standards from
receiving any federal grants.

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svrca06.pdf.
48
Id. at 2.
49
U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 234183, PREA DATA
COLLECTION
ACTIVITIES
2
(2011),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2198.
50
ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS REPORTED BY INMATES,
2008-09, at 5 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf.
51
ALLEN J. BECK & PAIGE M. HARRISON, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS REPORTED BY INMATES,
2007, at 2 (2007), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svsfpri07.pdf.
52
ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREA DATA
COLLECTION
ACTIVITIES,
2011,
at
1
(2011),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdca11.pdf.
53
42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609.
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The main question for this endeavor is why such misleading
language was needed for a piece of legislation that was unanimously
54
supported in both the House and Senate. The evidence presented above
clearly illustrates that the Act has not even come close to “eliminating”
sexual assault in America’s correctional facilities. If the drafters wanted
to be more accurate with their aspirations for the bill, the more tempered
word “reduction” could have been used (and has been used in other
55
short titles, the naming of the National Prison Rape Reduction
Commission, and also by other official governmental agencies in
56
reference to PREA, such as the NIJ.) By using “elimination,” Congress
explicitly and needlessly misled those who encountered the Act, be they
lawmakers or members of the public. Additionally, the short title sets a
lofty standard for the bill that is likely to never be achieved, thus
making those who enacted the measure or are working to implement the
law look foolhardy and ineffective.
C. Other Problematic Examples
Other examples of problematic bill titles are easily found
throughout history. For example, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984 was an omnibus measure that included many smaller acts, all
leveled at decreasing (or “‘comprehensively controlling”) crime, and
57
especially violent crime and drug crime. The smaller acts located
inside the proposal included certain measures (among others: the Armed
Career Criminal Act of 1984, the Aircraft Sabotage Act, the Bail
Reform Act of 1984, the Dangerous Drug Diversion Control Act of
1984, the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, the National Narcotics
Act of 1984, the Missing Children’s Act, the Sentencing Reform Act of
54
Bill Summary & Status – 108th Congress (2003-2004) – S.1435 – Major
Congressional
Actions,
THOMAS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01435:@@@R.
55
See, e.g., Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat, 2812
(codified as 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (2006)); Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime
Reduction Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-414, 118 Stat. 2327 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
56
See Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-79, 117 Stat. 972 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15601-15609 (2006)); NIJ’s Response to the Prison Rape Elimination Act,
CORR. TODAY, Feb. 2006, at 60, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213137.pdf
(explaining that the act calls for, inter alia, standards to reduce prison rape and stating that
the Act may help to “sharply reduce” the negative consequences of prison rape).
57
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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58

1984, and the Victims of Crime Act of 1984. Though it was named so,
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act certainly failed to
comprehensively control crime, and particularly violent crime, which
59
rose to historically high levels in the early 1990s. Additionally, the
percentage of drug related homicides rose to 7.4 percent in 1989, which
60
was the highest level in the past twenty years.
Another somewhat quirky but relevant example is the Controlling
the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN SPAM)
61
Act, which was passed in 2003 in an attempt to regulate commercial
email, especially bulk email. However, as the Bureau of Consumer
Protection points out, the Act regulates not just spam, or bulk, email,
62
but all commercial email. Some insiders have dubbed this law the
63
“You Can Spam Act,” as it essentially allows companies to send out
bulk email, or spam, if it meets a certain criteria. Given the name of the
Act, the first two criteria the law sets in place are slightly ironic:
(1) Don’t use false or misleading header information. Your “From,”
“To,” “Reply-To,” and routing information – including the
originating domain name and email address – must be accurate and
identify the person or business who initiated the message. (2) Don’t
use deceptive subject lines. The subject line must accurately reflect
64
the content of the message.

By naming the Act as if they were eliminating spam when they were
essentially enabling it, Congress created further confusion.
Additionally, the fact that the Act is so stringent with false or
misleading header information and deceptive subject lines is
preposterous given the deceptive name of the law.

58

Bill Summary & Status – 98th Congress (1983-1984) – H.J.RES.648 - Titles,
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d098:HJ00648:@@@T (last visited
Aug. 24, 2012).
59
Key Facts At A Glance, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS (last modified Sept. 1, 2012),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/cv2.cfm.
60
Drug And Crime Facts, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS (last modified Sept. 1, 2012),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/dcf/duc.cfm#drug-related.
61
CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, supra note 4.
62
The CAN-SPAM Act: A Compliance Guide for Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N. Sept.
2009), http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus61-can-spam-act-compliance-guide-business.
63
See Amit Asaravala, With This Law, You Can Spam, WIRED (Jan. 23, 2004),
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2004/01/62020.
64
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 62.
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BARRIERS TO REGULATION OF SHORT BILL
TITLES

Lest one seem hopelessly naïve, before beginning a discussion of
how the FTC might analyze short bill titles, it is worth discussing why
FTC regulation of short bill titles under current law is unlikely. The
FTC was established in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act,
and its duties include preventing “[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
65
affecting commerce. . . .” There are two significant barriers to FTC
enforcement against short bill titles. First, the FTC has jurisdiction only
over commercial advertising and regulation of non-commercial speech,
such as political speech, which might raise First Amendment issues.
Second, the FTC has been reluctant to take action against product brand
names as opposed to product claims. We discuss each below.
Speech, in its many forms, is protected in the United States under
the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has long held that
noncommercial speech – speech that does not relate to a commercial
transaction – is subject generally only to “reasonable time, place and
manner” restrictions and is virtually immune from content restriction –
with, for example, “yelling fire in a crowded theatre” and the
notoriously difficult to prove libel standard being two of the better
66
known exceptions. Commercial speech, however, is entitled to less
constitutional protection, as Justice Stevens writes, “few of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizens right to
see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our
67
choice.” The Supreme Court, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
68
Corp. established a four-pronged test for determining whether the
speech at issue was commercial. These prongs are whether the speech:





65
66
67
68

Proposes a commercial transaction
Refers to a specific product
Has an economic motivation; or
Is otherwise conceded by the defendant to be an
advertisement.

15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2006).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
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However, all four elements need not be present in order for the speech
69
to be classified as commercial.
Consistent with this Supreme Court precedent, the FTC has long
held that its jurisdiction over false or misleading practices is confined to
70
commercial speech. In the “Mr. Fit” case the FTC challenged an
advertisement by the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company (“RJR”). In the
advertisement, RJR published the results of a recent lifestyle health
study which followed the residents of Framingham, Massachusetts, over
the course of many years. According to RJR, the study purported to
71
cast doubt on the alleged link between smoking and heart disease. The
FTC filed an administrative complaint, claiming that the advertisement
72
was false and misleading. RJR defended by claiming that the speech
was on a matter of public interest and was noncommercial speech
73
protected under the First Amendment. In a lengthy opinion, the FTC
overturned the initial decision of the administrative law judge granting
RJR’s Motion to Dismiss and found that, accepting the allegations of
the complaint as true, the speech was, in fact, commercial, relying upon
the fact that the advertisement referred to a specific product, discussed a
specific product attribute (safety of the product), that it was
disseminated through a payment and that RJR had a direct sales-related
74
motive for disseminating the advertisement.
More recently, it appears that as consumers become increasingly
concerned about the social responsibility of companies that they
financially support, an increasing amount of companies have engaged in
corporate image advertising—touting, among other things, their
commitment to the environment, further blurring the lines between
commercial and fully protected speech. For example, in response, at
least one FTC Commissioner has suggested that the Commission lacks
75
jurisdiction over these ads as noncommercial speech.

69

See Id. at 68 n.14 (“nor do we mean to suggest that each of the characteristics present
in this case must necessarily be present in order for speech to be commercial”).
70
In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 111 FTC 539 (Fed. Trade Comm’n. 1988) (Mr. Fit
refers to the name of the study – “Multiple Risk Factor Intervention Trial.”).
71
Id. at 540.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 541.
74
Id. at 547.
75
J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks before the NAD Annual
Conference 2008: What’s New in Comparative Advertising, Claim Support and SelfRegulation, at 6 (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080923Rosch-
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So where does this leave short bill titles? Clearly, they are not
traditional commercial speech where a company seeks to sell a product
76
or service to a customer. There is, of course, some element of
commerce involved. Some legislation, such as the NAFTA
77
Implementation Act, regulates commercial transactions. In addition,
the passage or support of legislation can be a powerful fund-raising tool
which, like a commercial transaction, takes money directly out of the
pockets of consumers or corporations and thus relates to commerce.
However, the same could be said for many charities or other nonprofits, whose speech would almost certainly be entitled to full First
Amendment protection. Other indicia of commercial speech, such as the
proposition of a commercial transaction and a reference to a product are
also missing. In summary, even if the FTC sought to assert jurisdiction
over short bill titles, it seems unlikely that it could do so
78
constitutionally.
The second issue relates to the FTC’s (and federal courts’)
reluctance to regulate product names as opposed to product claims. In
other words, the titles of bills would not typically be regulated; rather,
the FTC and courts would look more toward what people said about the
bills. This reluctance stems in part from the tremendous good will and
79
intellectual property protection often associated with trade names. As a
NADSpeech.pdf.
76
See Bolger, 463 U.S. 66 (citing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)) (“core notion” of commercial
speech is proposing a commercial transaction.).
77
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation (NAFTA) Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
78
However, legislation was recently introduced that seeks to regulate political speech.
A hearing on S. 1994, the Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of
2011, was held on June 26, 2012 in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bill “amends the
Revised Statutes and federal criminal law to prohibit any person, whether acting under color
of law or otherwise, from knowingly misleading voters regarding: (1) the time or place of
holding any federal election, (2) the qualifications for or restrictions on voter eligibility for
any such election, or (3) an endorsement,” and, among other things, would establish a
private right of action for any person affected by such deception. Summary of Deceptive
Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2011, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01994:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited
Aug. 24, 2012). However, S. 1994 has not traveled any further in the legislative process, and
the bill seems likely never to make it out of the committee stage and might well be held
unconstitutional were it ever to become law.
79
See Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933) (reasoning
that trademarks constitute valuable assets and their destruction should not be ordered if the
same result can be achieved through less drastic means).
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80

result, in the famous “Aspercreme” case the FTC found that
advertisements for Aspercreme were misleading because they implied
that the product contained aspirin. Although the FTC did not enjoin use
of the name, it did require that a disclaimer appear stating that the
81
product did not contain aspirin. In addition, because product
advertising is so commonplace, ensuring that claims in advertising are
truthful likely more than compensates for, and perhaps helps clarify,
82
any misperceptions that may derive from a product’s name.
In the context of legislation, regulating the name of a bill’s short
title seems less daunting than doing the same for a product. First, there
is not the same financial investment in good will and intellectual
property protection for a bill; however, it may be the case that people
have become familiar with a particular title so there is at least some
83
potential for confusion if a short title were changed. Second, the use of
disclaimers do not appear to be particularly helpful for bills, especially
because short titles are most frequently mentioned in the press, and
because they have long titles, which typically describe the function of
the bills in more detail. It is difficult to imagine the New York Times
reporting on the No Child Left Behind Act and noting in a disclaimer
that “some children will actually be left behind,” nor would there be any
means of requiring it. Finally, and most importantly, in many cases the
short bill title is the “claim” (e.g. the elimination of prison rape, or the
84
comprehensive control of crime). There is not a widespread advertising
claim associated with particular legislation that might help clarify what
would otherwise be a deceptive title. However, the deceptive
advertising standards developed by the FTC are discussed in detail
below. In summary, the FTC’s traditional reluctance to order trade
85
name deletion seems less likely under the second issue.
80

In re Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (Fed. Trade Comm’n 1984).
Id. at 842-843.
82
See Id. § 5, ¶ 3,103.
83
However, short bill titles often change when travelling between the House and
Senate. Also, all bills originating in Congress receive an official number, and thus a change
in the short title would be easily noted if an individual could locate the bill number.
84
See, e.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, 42 U.S.C.A. § 15601.
85
There is also the issue of the speech and debate clause. Traditionally the speech and
debate clause provides immunity for statements made on the floor of the House or the
Senate. This would presumably extend to the names given to legislation. However, the
constitutional protection of the speech and debate clause has been held not to extend to
congressional press releases. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (U.S. 1979).
Such releases are fairly commonplace with regard to legislation and would invariably
81
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WHICH FTC STANDARDS ARE APPLICABLE?

A. FTC Policy Statement on Deception
In 1983, following numerous Commission and court decisions, the
FTC took the view that nowhere was there “a single definitive statement
of the Commission’s view of its authority” in terms of deception, and
86
thus issued such a policy statement. In defining deception that is
legally actionable, the FTC included three requirements, as outlined by
the sub-heading sections of the policy statement:




There Must Be A Representation, Omission, Or Practice
That Is Likely To Mislead The Consumer;
The Act Or Practice Must Be Considered From The
Perspective Of The Reasonable Consumer; and
The Representation, Omission Or Practice Must Be
87
Material.

These requirements shall now be analyzed.
In explaining the first element, the FTC notes that “the issue is
whether the act or practice is likely to mislead, rather than whether it
88
causes actual deceptions.” In one case, a product erroneously conveyed
that it was proven to be superior to other products, a statement that the
89
FTC subsequently regarded as deceptive. In reaching this decision, the
FTC noted that “the important consideration is the net impression
90
conveyed to the public.” The fact that an omission occurred does not
mean that the FTC is obligated to pursue a claim, as sometimes there
must be specific evidence on consumer expectations; if this is not
91
available, then the FTC may not pursue the case. For example, baitand-switch offers may be invalid based on whether there was a bona
92
fide offer, an implication that a product is fit for the purposes that it is

include the short bill title. Thus, under Hutchinson they may be challengeable.
86
Letter from James C. Miller, Chairman, FTC, to John D. Dingell, Chairman, House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on Deception, (Oct. 14, 1983),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2012)
[hereinafter FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception].
87
Id. at pts. 2, 3, 4.
88
Id. at pt. 2, para.1.
89
Id. at n.7 (citing In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 98 F.T.C. 136, 374 (1981), aff’d, 695
F.2d 681, 688 (3d Cir. 1982)).
90
Id.
91
Id. at n.13 (citing Leonard F. Porter, Inc., 88 F.T.C. 546, 626 (1976)).
92
FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception. pt. 2, para. 5.
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93

being sold, or concerns when marketing inaccurate or incomplete
94
information. Under this standard, short titles are likely representations
that at least have the potential to mislead voters and elected officials as
to the purpose and effect of the legislation.
The second requirement is that the act or practice must be
considered from the perspective of the reasonable consumer. The FTC
states that “a material practice that misleads a significant minority of
95
reasonable consumers is deceptive,” and that “the Commission
considers the totality of the practice in determining how reasonable
96
consumers are likely to respond.” The FTC notes, however, that
companies are not responsible for every outlandish response a particular
advertisement may provoke, and that there are always likely to be a
97
select few who misunderstand even a reasonable representation. The
FTC also notes that when “determining the meaning of an
advertisement, a piece of promotional material or a sales presentation,
the important criterion is the net impression that it is likely to make on
98
the general populace.” However, the FTC states that if advertisements
are addressed to particular groups in society (i.e. children or elderly,
etc.), then the test of whether an advertisement is deceptive is judged
99
from the perspective of a reasonable member of that group. Perhaps
most appropriate to short bill titles, the FTC states that “depending on
the circumstances, accurate information in the text may not remedy a
false headline because reasonable consumers may glance only at the
100
headline.” False headlines can be remedied in the body of the text or
in the fine print, but there are exceptions depending on how outlandish
101
the headline is.
93

Id.
Id.
95
Id. at n.20.
96
Id. at pt. 3, para. 1.
97
Id. at pt. 3, para. 2; see also Heinz W. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963).
98
FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception, at pt. 3, para. 4.
99
Id. at pt. 3, para. 5.
100
Id. at pt. 3, para 11. (emphasis added); see also In re Litton Indus.,Inc., 97 F.T.C. 1,
71 n.6 (1981), aff’d as modified, 676 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating disclosures presented
in fine print were not sufficient to remedy a deceptive headline).
101
Id. at pt. 3, para. 10-11 (citing In re Giant Food, Inc., 61 F.T.C. 326, 348 (1962)
(stating disclaimers contained in fine print may fail to correct a wrong impression which is
deceptive as those reading ads may not take time to read them); cf. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC,
542 F.2d 611, 618 (3d Cir. 1976) (reversing FTC Commission’s finding that deception
resulting from a slogan used by a company could not be remedied with any qualifying
94
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Interestingly, the FTC “generally will not bring advertising cases
based on subjective claims (taste, feel, appearance, smell) or on
102
correctly stated opinion claims.” Most tendentious short titles produce
claims that are neither subjective nor opinion-based (i.e. eliminating
prison rape or comprehensively controlling crime). Additionally, it
points out that “obviously exaggerated or puffing representations”
103
usually are not pursued. Yet the FTC does add a caveat, noting that if
consumers believe the claims to be real, then they indeed are
104
actionable. The FTC asserts that it evaluates claims very closely
before proceeding, and that normal market rules (i.e. sellers wanting
105
repeat customers) often discourages deceptive practices. Outrageous
claims made in short titles which have not fulfilled their lofty promises
(see above) have not encouraged lawmakers to temper the language in
such titles. Thus, congressional short titles have only become more
outlandish throughout the years.
The third element is that “representation, omission or practice must
106
be a material one for deception to occur.” To explain this standard, the
FTC notes that “a ‘material’ misrepresentation or practice is one which
is likely to affect a consumer’s choice of or conduct regarding a
product. If inaccurate or omitted information is material, injury is likely
107
to be found.” In other words, material information is of the type that is
important to consumers.
In terms of the legislative process, the main material
misrepresentation or practice would likely originate from those voting
for such measures: whether a particular title would make lawmakers
support or oppose a bill, either because they do not take the time to fully
digest and understand the text of the bill, or because they have done so
108
but fear the political consequences of opposing it. The FTC does note
that “[d]epending on the facts, information pertaining to the central
characteristics of the product or service will be presumed material,”
language)).
102
Id. at pt. 3, para. 13.
103
FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception, at pt. 3, para. 14.
104
Id.
105
Id. at pt. 3 para. 16.
106
Id. at pt. 4, para. 1.
107
Id. at pt. 2, para. 5. (citing In re Volkswagen of Am., 99 F.T.C. 446 (1982); Fedearl
Trade Comm’n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
108
Jones, supra note 25 (noting how one lawmaker explains that he “get[s] hurt
politically” every time he votes against a law with an evocative, popular title).
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including the “safety” or “efficacy” of said products. This could have
significant implications for many short titles which advocate that they
are “effective”, “efficient,” and “responsible” or attempt to prescribe
110
“protection” of certain groups or “prevention” of certain offenses.
Indeed, it was already revealed in an earlier article by Jones that a
majority of interviewees believed short bill titles affected a measure’s
111
chances of becoming law. When examining legislation, others could
also have material grounds against misleading or deceptive bill titles.
Special interest groups, NGOs, journalists, and most importantly,
voters, all have an interest in such matters. Such groups or individuals
may decide to support or oppose a particular law because of claims
made in short bill titles, particularly claims to protect children, prevent
certain offenses, halt spam from entering email inboxes, and
comprehensively control crime, as these are honorable goals. Many of
these laws are championed on campaign trails to demonstrate to voters
that they have been working on societal problems, or conversely, to
112
demonstrate that certain individuals did not support a particular law. If
these short bill titles are misleading or deceptive, as to misrepresent the
laws, then these short bill titles are material, because they falsely
express what the law actually intends to do and/or did.

109

FTC Letter/Policy Statement on Deception, at pt. 4, para. 3 (citing In re Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 456 (1972), aff’d, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); In re J.B. Williams Co., 68 F.T.C. 481, 546 (1965), aff’d, 381
F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967)).
110
See, e.g., Effective Child Pornography Prosecution Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110358, 122 Stat. 4001; Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A
Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144; Judicial Disclosure Responsibility
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-24, 121 Stat. 100; Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558; Joshua Omvig Veterans Suicide Prevention
Act, Pub. L. No. 110-110, 121 Stat. 1031.
111
See Jones, supra note 25.
112
OBAMA/BIDEN CAMPAIGN WEBSITE, www.barackobama.com. Though it is also
coined “Obamacare” the President’s official campaign website repeatedly talks about the
Affordable
Care
Act.
Issues
–
Healthcare
–
Barack
Obama,
http://www.barackobama.com/health-care?source=primary-nav.
Also,
the
website
disparages the No Child Left Behind law. Issues – Healthcare – Barack Obama,
http://www.barackobama.com/education?source=primary-nav.
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B. FTC Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising
Almost ten years after their policy statement on deception, the FTC
issued a complimentary “Enforcement Policy Statement on Food
Advertising,” which focused on the nutrient and health content claims
113
of foods.
The Commission notes that this statement also
complemented the Nutrition and Labeling Education Act of 1990
114
(“NLEA”) and the subsequent Food and Drug Administration’s
115
(“FDA”) food labeling regulations in accordance with the NLEA. As
previously discussed, short bill titles are often claims in themselves, as
they purport to contain certain characteristics (i.e. responsibility,
accountability, etc.), or they express certain actions the legislation is
going to accomplish (i.e. the protection of certain people or prevention
or elimination of certain activities). Indeed, as noted above, many of
these explicit and implied claims never come close to fruition. By
analyzing the FTC’s policy statement on food advertising, a better
understanding is developed of whether the claims made on the short
titles of bills would pass an FTC deception analysis.
In deciding whether a food advertisement is deceptive, the FTC
first looks at both the express and implied claims contained within the
116
advertisement, both of which are important for short titles . Express
claims are perhaps most relevant to short bill titles, as “an express claim
117
directly makes a representation.” Tendentious and misleading bill
titles often do this: to use an example from above, the Prison Rape
Elimination Act states that prison rape will be eliminated with passage
of the Act. Thus, if certain express claims are being made in short titles
rather than describing the legislation in question, they would be subject
to an FTC deception analysis, consisting of the factors listed in the
above deception policy statement. The FTC also notes that omitting
certain material statements may be deceptive and that “deception can
occur through omission of information that is necessary to prevent an

113

FED. TRADE COMM’N. ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON FOOD ADVERTISING
(1994), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-food.shtm#3.
114
Nutrition Labeling Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(1990).
115
See generally 21 C.F.R. § 101.13.
116
FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 113, “Legal Framework for
Commission” at para. 3.
117
Id.
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affirmative representation from being misleading.”
Short titles tend to make heroic claims without mentioning that
such claims are aspirational. The Prison Rape Elimination Act example
used above is a good test case for this standard. If the title read
“Examining Prison Rape to Enhance Inmate Protection Act,” it may
well have passed a deceptive analysis test, as the title fully
acknowledges the aspirational essence of the legislation. However, the
simple title “Prison Rape Elimination Act” expressly states that prison
rape will be eliminated with passage of the Act, without noting the
legislation’s aspirational character. Conversely, a properly labeled
example is the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation
119
Act. Though the bill was controversial, the short title is descriptive
and expresses the main objective of the Act in a reasonable manner.
The FTC also notes that objective claims should be supported by
valid evidence, stating that it is deceptive “to make an express or
implied nutrition or health benefit claim for a food unless, at the time
the claim is made, the advertiser possesses and relies upon a reasonable
120
basis substantiating the claim.” A reasonable basis claim is usually
121
supported by competent and reliable evidence, which the FTC has
more thoroughly described as,
tests, analyses, research, studies or other evidence based on the
expertise of professionals in the relevant area, that have been
conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by persons qualified
to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the profession to
122
yield accurate and reliable results.

Congressional bills are not subject to any reasonable basis standard; this
is true even when short titles express outlandish claims, such as the
elimination of prison rape with overcrowded prisons and over two
million people behind bars, or the canning of spam in a digital age that
thrives on email and Internet marketing.

118

Id. at para.4.
NAFTA, supra note 77.
120
FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 113, para. 5 (citing In re
Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. at 839).
121
FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 113, para. 6 (noting that the
“substantiation must also be examined in the context of the entire body of relevant evidence,
particularly if it produces results that are contrary to that body of evidence.”).
122
FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 113, pt. 4(A), para. 5 (citing
Gracewood Fruit Co., FTC No. C-3470 (Oct. 29, 1993) (consent order); Pompeian, Inc.,
FTC No. C-3402 (Oct. 27, 1992) (consent order)).
119
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C. Kraft, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Kraft, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Commission is meaningful because it relies on many
anti-trust, trade and constitutional law factors to determine whether the
advertising in question was indeed deceptive. It stands as the barometer
by which advertisements are judged for actionable causes by the FTC. It
also describes how the FTC should go about deeming an advertisement
deceptive, explains why misleading commercial speech is not protected
123
under the Constitution, and renders what is material in such cases.
These areas will be analyzed in turn.
First, the court reiterated the premise of the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission Act, which “makes it unlawful to engage in unfair or
deceptive commercial practices, 15 U.S.C. § 45, or to induce consumers
to purchase certain products through advertising that is misleading in a
material respect,” and acknowledged that the FTC is given the authority
124
to regulate such matters. The Kraft decision also noted that,
125

In FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., the Supreme Court held that
while the words “deceptive advertising” set forth a legal standard
that derives its final meaning from judicial construction, an FTC
finding is “to be given great weight by reviewing courts” because it
“rests so heavily on inference and pragmatic judgment” and in light
126
of the frequency with which the Commission handles these cases.

Furthermore, in terms of facial validity regarding deceptive advertising,
the FTC can rely on its own judgment in terms of what cases to pursue,
and does not have to conduct surveys in order to determine that a
127
commercial has a tendency to mislead.
Next, when discussing commercial speech, the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that while commercial speech is protected by the
United States Constitution, “false, deceptive, or misleading advertising”
does not serve the public interest and thus “remains subject to
128
restraint.” Further, the Kraft court recognized that “Kraft’s [F]irst
[A]mendment challenge is doomed by the Supreme Court’s holding in
Zauderer [v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio],
123
124
125
126
127
128

Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 52, 55).
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d at 316 (citing Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 385).
Id. at 319 (citing Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 392).
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982).
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which established that no [F]irst [A]mendment concerns are raised
when facially apparent implied claims are found without resort to
129
extrinsic evidence.” Reminiscent of the problematic bill title
examples, were it not for the fact that, as discussed above, they may be
deemed non-commercial speech, these facially apparent implied claims
would likely fall within the ambit of Zauderer. The court further noted
that “commercial speech is less susceptible to the chilling effect of
regulation than other, more traditionally recognized forms of speech,
such as political discourse,” primarily because it is motivated by
130
profit.
Finally, in regard to materiality, the court noted that “[a] claim is
considered material if it ‘involves information that is important to
consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct
131
regarding a product.’” The Commission is entitled to apply, within
132
reason, a presumption of materiality, and it does so with three types of
claims:
(1) express claims;
(2) implied claims where there is evidence that the seller intended to
make the claim; and
(3) claims that significantly involve health, safety, or other areas
133
with which reasonable consumers would be concerned.

Notably, the court recognizes the FTC’s guidance that a claim is
material if it is “likely to affect the consumer’s conduct or decision with
134
regard to a product.”
However, the court also notes that “restrictions on potentially
misleading speech, by contrast, can be no ‘broader than reasonably
necessary to prevent the [deception]’ and may not categorically prohibit
135
such speech if less restrictive alternatives are available.” This seems
129

Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d at 321 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 652-53 (1985)).
130
Id. (relying on Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22
(1984)).
131
Id. at 322 (citing In re Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 165 (Fed. Trade Comm’n
1984); FTC Policy Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 175, 182) (as appended to In re Cliffdale
Assocs.).
132
Id. (citing Colgate-Palmolive, Co., 380 U.S. at 392).
133
Id. (citing In re Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 816-17 (1984); FTC Policy
Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 182-83 (as appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs.).
134
Kraft, Inc., 970 F.2d at 323-4 (citing FTC Policy Statement, 103 F.T.C. at 175) (as
appended to In re Cliffdale Assocs.).
135
Id. at 107-108 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203).
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like a healthy modern standard, especially when it comes to the titles of
bills. It would be one thing to restrict the historically interesting and
wildly imaginative art of political sloganeering, but it is quite another to
deceptively label a proposed bill as effective; protective of a certain
segment of society; or suggesting marked improvement in a policy area,
simply because a lawmaker wants the bill to pass and become law.
The title of this Article asks whether congressional short titles
would survive FTC scrutiny. As seen above, if many of these titles were
conceptualized as branding under advertising principles, they would be
subject to a long list of rules and regulations established under both case
law and FTC deceptive practice principles. Many congressional bill
titles in the United States would likely be subject to legal action, as they
qualify under all three elements. Also, the bills would meet the
requirements of material grounds set forth at both the legislative and the
general public or societal levels.
V.

CONCLUSION

An interesting FTC Business Guide Alert came in October of 2001,
136
shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It noted that after the attacks,
“consumers are more sensitive to ‘Made in USA’ claims and more
137
interested in buying American-made goods.” The alert mainly
138
reminded businesses of the FTC’s “all or virtually all” standard and
provided links to relevant websites for more information. But while
companies and products were rigorously subjected to the FTC standard,
139
that same month Congress was busy enacting the USA PATRIOT Act,
whose name was not subject to any standard whatsoever — not even a

136
FTC, BUSINESS ALERT: SELLING ‘AMERICAN MADE’ PRODUCTS? WHAT BUSINESSES
NEED TO
KNOW
ABOUT
MAKING MADE IN USA CLAIMS,
(2001),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/alerts/alt101.pdf .
137
Id.
138
FTC, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON U.S. ORIGIN CLAIMS (1997),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/12/epsmadeusa.htm (“A product that is all or virtually all made
in the United States will ordinarily be one in which all significant parts and processing that
go into the product are of U.S. origin.”).
139
Well, maybe they were not all too busy. The bill was introduced in the House on
October 23rd and passed on the 24th. The bill then passed the Senate on the 25th, and was
sent to the President that same day. See Bill Summary & Statutes, Major Congressional
Actions,
H.R.
3162,
107th
Cong.
(2001-2001),
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03162:@@@R (see the congressional timeline for the bill in the
section entitled, “Major Actions.”).
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140

qualifying one.
Although the Act contained many contentious measures related to
141
civil liberties, some of which were challenged in court, Congress was
allowed to unequivocally stamp the measure as inherently American by
using “USA” in the title, and also deem it “patriotic,” thus inscribing the
choice of controversial evocative wording into the statute books. It
seems noticeably ironic and deeply incongruous that products in the
USA are so heavily regulated that consumer watchdog agencies, such as
the FTC, strictly enforce “Made in the USA” labeling restrictions –
142
even on small, harmless products – but a massive federal law that
affects millions of citizens and a wide range of governmental operations
is not subject to any type of binding constitutional regulation as to how
it is officially labeled.
Similar to how there is no particular “bright line” test for a “Made
in the USA” label for products, there is no corresponding rule for
misleading, tendentious, and/or evocative short titles. Given the current
state of tendentious and, at times, outlandish congressional short titles, it
seems that some standard must be implemented to which such titles
should strive to achieve. Yet in this regard, the United States federal
government has failed mightily. Is it not a tautology that the
governments and institutions that regulate deceptive advertising must
hold themselves accountable to the same standards by which they judge
others? We believe this proposition to be highly equitable.
Eventually, it must be determined what legal status legislative
short titles possess in Congress. Either they represent the full force of
law that they are usually inscribed with in the congressional record, and
thus should be subject to the technical accuracy and formal, descriptive
language of the law; or, as many of the above interviewees suggested,
and which this article has taken into consideration, they are branding
elements, and therefore should be subject to a form of regulations
similar to those governing deceptive advertising practices. While the
First Amendment may make it difficult for the FTC to exert jurisdiction
over such matters, some form of scrutiny could still be adopted. For

140

USA PATRIOT Act, supra note 2.
Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Doe
v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
142
See Press Release, FTC, Wire Manufacturer and its Distributor and a Cosmetics Co.
Agree to Settle Charges of Making Misleading “Made in the USA” Claims (Sept. 13, 1999)
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1999/09/wirephysform.shtm.
141
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example, review and approval by a bipartisan committee or watchdog
group should be considered. If it is determined that short titles are part
of the traditionally legal aspects of legislation, then such titles need
rules and recommendations as to what are proper and improper short
titles, and these must be defined in either the congressional rules, and/or
through other legal devices, such as official acts. If it is determined that
short titles are ‘branding’ instruments, then such titles should
unequivocally not appear on official documents as they are traveling
through the legislative process or after they are enacted, and should be
subjected to the same deceptive advertising standards by which most
every other entity is governed.

